Tinubu, America’s Air Strikes and Nigeria’s Imperiled Sovereignty By Umar Ardo, Ph.D

Tinubu, America’s Air Strikes and Nigeria’s Imperiled Sovereignty

                       By

         Umar Ardo, Ph.D

The reported American airstrikes conducted within Nigerian territory in Sokoto State targeted at ISIS fighters raise serious constitutional, legal, strategic and political questions that go to the core of Nigeria’s sovereignty and democratic governance. These questions are not matters of sentiment or politics; they are fundamental matters of national survival! They require urgent clarification, as their implications extend beyond security operations to the grave foundation of the country’s existence as a sovereign republic and its constitutional order.

2. Before we look at the operational implications of these strikes, let us first examine its legitimacy. And to do that, the legal analysis must turn on the issue of sovereignty and consent. Under international law, the territorial integrity of sovereign states is a peremptory norm. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any sovereign state, save for three narrowly defined exceptions. First is authorization by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. Second is self-defence under Article 51. And third is the derivative basis of intervention by consent, which is only lawful where such consent is validly given by the recognized government acting within its constitutional authority.

3. Accordingly, if the reported strikes had been carried out without Nigeria’s consent, they would have constituted a *prima facie* violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as well as the principle of non-intervention reflected in customary international law and Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act. In such circumstances, Nigeria would have been legally entitled - and indeed obliged - to protest, seek diplomatic and legal redress and internationalize the matter through the United Nations and the African Union.

4. But from the statement issued out by the Nigerian Defence Information Department, they were not a unilateral action of the United States, but were with the consent and in coordination with the Nigerian military authorities. Now then the inquiry shifts to the constitutional validity of that consent. Under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), executive power is vested in the President by Section 5, but that power is not absolute. It is circumscribed by the Constitution and subject to legislative oversight. The control and operational use of the armed forces is addressed in Sections 217 and 218. While Section 218(1) designates the President as Commander-in-Chief, Section 218(4) expressly empowers the National Assembly to make laws regulating the operational use of the armed forces. This provision has consistently been interpreted as anchoring civilian and legislative oversight over military deployments and security cooperation, particularly where such actions have far-reaching implications for national sovereignty and external relations. 

5. Furthermore, Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives under Section 19 emphasize respect for international law, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the affairs of other states. Any executive action that invites foreign military force into Nigerian territory without legislative scrutiny undermines these constitutional provisions. Where such cooperation is even grounded in treaties or security agreements, Section 12 of the Constitution further requires domestication by the National Assembly before such treaties or agreements can have legal effect within Nigeria. Accordingly, any invitation or authorization granted unilaterally by the President for foreign military strikes on Nigerian soil in absence of National Assembly approval or clear statutory framework becomes a serious constitutional breach. Consent given ultra vires the Constitution cannot cure an otherwise unlawful use of force under international law. 

6. Now the questions are: did President Bola Tinubu obtain the approval of the National Assembly as required by the Constitution? If yes, when? Did it follow the laid down legislative procedures? To the best of my knowledge, the answers to these questions are simply in the negative. Then how can that be? Where did we throw away constitutionalism and rule of law? Since the strikes were carried out with the consent, cooperation and coordination of the Nigerian government, a distinct but equally serious constitutional problem arises. Since the Nigerian Constitution does not vest unilateral authority in the President to invite foreign military forces into the country, with such actions subject to legislative oversight and approval by the National Assembly, the apparent act of President Tinubu in circumventing this requirement clearly constitutes an ominous breach of constitutional procedure and an abuse of executive power. 

7. Pointedly, operational considerations of these strikes further compound the legitimacy issue. Effective counterterrorism cooperation presupposes clear intelligence sharing, defined rules of engagement and alignment with national security priorities. The targeting of Sokoto state with no prior established ISIS presence raises questions about whether Nigerian military authorities do exercise meaningful control over the operation or they are themselves mere onlookers. Or, even more serious, whether the Nigerian government simply ceded discretionary military right to a foreign power to be used in advancing objectives not demonstrably tied to Nigeria’s security needs. Either scenario reflects a failure of governance and compromise of sovereignty in relations to our national security policy. 

8. From an empirical security standpoint, therefore, as earlier alluded to, the justification advanced for the strikes is deeply flawed. Both President Donald Trump’s Tweet and the Statement of Major General Uba, speaking for Nigeria’s Defense Department, claiming that the strikes were carried out at the instance of the invitation of the Nigerian government and the cooperation and coordination of the Nigerian military aimed at attacking ISIS bases cannot just be true. “The Armed Forces of Nigeria, in conjunction with the United States of America, has successfully conducted precision strike operations against identified foreign ISIS-linked elements operating in parts of North West Nigeria,” Uba was reported to have said. From a military and factual standpoints, this justification advanced for the strikes is questionable.

9. The reason being that ISIS-affiliated insurgent activity in Nigeria has been geographically mainly concentrated in the Northeast, notably Borno and parts of Yobe States. Sokoto State has been identified with banditry and the Lakurawas, both of them pure criminal gangs, but not ever identified as an operational base of ISIS. This discrepancy necessitates a clear explanation of the intelligence basis and strategic military rationale for the reported United States airstrikes action.

10. Also very importantly, there is a broader moral and precedential dimension that weakens Nigeria’s standing in challenging American air strikes actions, even if unilaterally deployed. The Tinubu administration itself has only recently engaged in unilateral cross-border military air strikes against the tiny Republic of Benin under the guise of preventing or responding to an alleged coup attempt. If Nigeria asserts for itself a unilateral right to use force beyond its borders without multilateral authorization or clear legal basis, it erodes the very principles of sovereignty and non-intervention upon which its own protest could have relied upon in the event of such belligerency against it. In international relations, precedent matters. A state that appears to endorse the logic of unilateral force cannot convincingly object when that same logic is turned against it. The danger is the normalization of the doctrine that *might is right*, where power, not law, becomes the ultimate arbiter. I am sure America is capitalizing on this in its current military policy towards Nigeria. Surely, through several such poor policy choices of the Tinubu administration Nigeria is drifting inexorably into ruination! 

11. In conclusion, constitutional democracies derive legitimacy not merely from electoral mandate but from adherence to rule of law, constitutionalism, transparency and accountability. When executive action places national sovereignty in doubt and constitutional processes in question, the burden of justification lies squarely with the executive. Accordingly, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu owes the nation a full and detailed explanation of the legal basis, authorization process and strategic rationale for the reported United States air strikes in Sokoto - and he must immediately do that in a special national broadcast! In the absence of such justification, constitutional remedies must follow. Either he resigns in an acknowledgment of responsibility in the national interest or failing that, the National Assembly is obligated to initiate forthwith impeachment proceedings to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the Federal Republic. Nigeria cannot, and should not, continue to take any more of the president’s executive impunities as they are driving the country into a complete failed state.